We study three values for transferable utility games with coalition structure, including the Owen coalitional value and two weighted versions with weights given by the size of the coalitions. We provide three axiomatic characterizations using the properties of E¢ -ciency, Linearity, Independence of Null Coalitions, and Coordination, with two versions of Balanced Contributions inside a Coalition and Weighted Sharing in Unanimity Games, respectively.
Introduction
Coalition structures are important in many real-world contexts, such as the formation of cartels or bidding rings, alliances or trading blocs among nation states, research joint ventures, and political parties.
These situations can be modelled through transferable utility (T U , for short) games, in which the players partition themselves into coalitions for the purpose of bargaining. All players in the same coalition agree before the play that any cooperation with other players will only by carried out collectively. That is, either all the members of the coalition take part of it or none of them (Malawski, 2004) .
Given a coalition structure, bargaining occurs between coalitions and between players in the same coalition. The main idea is that the coalitions play among themselves as individual agents in a game among coalitions, and then, the pro…t obtained by each coalition is distributed among its members. Owen (1977) studied the allocation that arises from applying the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953b) twice: …rst in the game among coalitions, and then in a reduced game inside each coalition. In this latter step, the worth a subcoalition in the reduced game is de…ned as the Shapley value that the subcoalition would get in the game among coalitions, assuming that their partners are out.
Owen's approach assumes a symmetric treatment for each coalition. As Harsanyi (1977) points out, in unanimity games this procedure implies that players would be better o¤ bargaining by themselves than joining forces. This is know as the join-bargaining paradox, or the Harsanyi paradox.
An alternative approach is to give a di¤erent treatment, or weight, to each coalition. Following this idea, Levy and McLean (1989) apply the weighted Shapley value (Shapley, 1953a; Samet, 1987, 1988) in the game among coalitions, as well as in the reduced games.
A natural weight for each coalition is its own size. In fact, a motivation for the weighted Shapley value is precisely the di¤erence in size 1 . Moreover, Kalai and Samet (1987, Corollary 2 in Section 7) show that the size of coalitions are appropriate weights for the players. The reason is that if we force the players in a coalition to work together (by destroying their resources when they are not all together), then the aggregated Shapley value of each coalition in the new game coincides with the weighted Shapley value of the game among coalitions, with weights given by the size of the coalition 2 . It is then reasonable to apply the Levy and McLean value with intracoalitional symmetry and weights given by the size of the coalition. However, in Levy and McLean's model, the weight of the subcoalitions in the reduced game remains constant, even though these subcoalitions may have di¤er-ent size. An alternative approach is to vary the weight of the coalitions in the reduced game. Vidal-Puga (2006) follows this approach to de…ne a new coalitional value. This new coalitional value does not present the Harsanyi paradox.
In this paper, we characterize the above coalitional values: the coalitional Owen value (Owen, 1977) , the coalitional Levy-McLean weighted value (Levy and McLean, 1989 ) with the weights given by the size of the coalition, and the new value presented by Vidal-Puga (2006) . These three values have in common the following feature: First, the worth of the grand coalition is divided among the coalitions following either the Shapley value (Owen), or the weighted Shapley value with weights given by the size of the coalitions (Levy and McLean, Vidal-Puga), and then the pro…t obtained by each coalition is distributed among its members following the Shapley value.
Some of the axioms used in the characterizations (e¢ ciency, intracoalitional symmetry, and linearity) are standard in the literature, others (independence of null coalitions and two intracoalitional versions of balanced contributions) are used in many di¤erent frameworks. Moreover, we introduce new properties in this kind of problems: coordination (which asserts that internal changes in a coalition which do no a¤ect the game among coalitions, do not in ‡uence the …nal payment of the rest of the players) and two properties of sharing in unanimity games (which establish how should the payment be under the grand coalition unanimity game).
The properties of e¢ ciency, linearity, intracoalitional symmetry and independence of null coalitions are natural extensions of the classical properties that characterize the Shapley value (e¢ ciency, linearity, symmetry and null player, respectively) to the game among coalitions. On the other hand, the properties of balanced contributions are applied to the game inside a coalition, and each of them is a natural extension of the property of balanced contributions that also characterizes, with e¢ ciency, the Shapley value (Myerson, 1980). Hence, the three values proposed here can be seen as natural extensions of the Shapley value for games with coalition structure. Additionally, the property of coordination formalizes the idea presented by Owen that the players inside a coalition negotiate among them, but always assuming that the rest of the coalitions remain together (see for example the game v 1 de…ned by Kalai and Samet, 1987 , Section 7).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model. In Section 3 we de…ne a family that includes the three coalitional values. In Section 4 we present the properties used in the characterization and we study which properties satisfy the coalitional values. In Section 5 we present the characterization results. In Section 6 we prove that the properties are independent. In Section 7 we present some concluding remarks.
Notation
Let U = f1; 2; :::g be the (in…nite) set of potential players.
Given a …nite subset N U , let (N ) denote the set of all orders in N . Given 2 (N ); let Pre(i; ) denote the set of the elements in N which come before i in the order given by , i.e. Pre(i; ) = fj 2 N : (j) < (i)g. For any S N , S denotes the order induced in S by (for all i; j 2 S;
A transfer utility game, T U game, or simply a game, is a pair (N; v) where N U is …nite and v : 2 N ! R satis…es v(;) = 0. When N is clear, we can also denote (N; v) as v. Given a T U game (N; v) and S N , v(S) is called the worth of S. Given S N , we denote the restriction of (N; v) to S as (S; v).
For simplicity, we write
Two
The set of non-null players in (N; v) is the carrier of (N; v), and we denote it as Carr (N; v). Given two games (N; v), (N; w), the game (N; v+w) is de…ned as (v+w)(S) = v(S)+w(S) for all S N . Given a game (N; v) and a real number , the game (N; v) is de…ned as ( v) (S) = v (S) for all S N .
Given N U …nite, we call coalition structure over N a partition of the player set N , i.e. C = fC 1 ; C 2 ; ::::; C m g 2 N is a coalition structure if it satis…es S Cq2C C q = N and C q \ C r = ; when q 6 = r: We also assume C q 6 = ; for all q:
We say that C q 2 C is a null coalition if all its members are null players.
For any S N; we denote the restriction of C to the players in S as C S ; i:e: C S = fC q \ S : C q 2 C and C q \ S 6 = ;g:
For any S C q 2 C, we will frequently study the case in which the players in C q nS leave the game. In this case, we write C S instead of the more cumbersome C N n(CqnS) .
Given a game (N; v) and a coalition structure C = fC 1 ; C 2 ; ::::; C m g over N , the game among coalitions is the TU game (M; v=C) where M = f1; 2; :::mg and (v=C) (Q) = v S q2Q C q for all Q M . We denote the game (N; v) with coalition structure C = fC 1 ; C 2 ; ::::; C m g over N as (N; v; C) or (v; C): When N and C are clear, we also write v instead of (N; v; C).
Given S N , S 6 = ;, the unanimity game with carrier S, (N; u Similarly, a coalitional value is a function that assigns to each game with coalition structure (N; v; C) a vector in R N . Each value can also be considered as a coalitional value by simply ignoring the coalition structure. Hence, we de…ne the coalitional Shapley value of the game (N; v; C) as Sh (N; v; C) = Sh (N; v). One of the most important coalitional values is the Owen value (Owen, 1977) .
Another generalization for a value is the following: a weighted value ! is a function that assigns to each T U game (N; v) and each x 2 R N ++ a vector x in R N . For each i 2 N , x i is the weight of player i. We will say that a weighted value ! extends or generalizes a value if x (N; v) = (N; v) for any weight vector x with x i = x j for all i; j 2 N . The most prominent weighted generalization of the Shapley value is the weighted Shapley value Sh ! (Shapley (1953a), Samet (1987, 1988) ).
Games with coalition structure
We now focus on games with coalition structure. Fix C = fC 1 ; :::; C m g and let M = f1; :::; mg. For each pair ( ; ! ), where is a value and ! is a weighted value, we de…ne two coalitional values [ ! ] and h ! i. In both cases, the idea is to divide the worth of the grand coalition in two steps: In the …rst step, ! is used to divide the worth of the grand coalition in the game among coalitions, with weights given by the size of each coalition. In the second step, is used to divide the worth inside each coalition.
For each coalition structure C = fC 1 ; C 2 ; :::; C m g over N , let (C) 2 R M + be de…ned as q (C) = jC q j for all 3 q 2 M . Given C q 2 C, the reduced TU game with …xed weights C q ; v
The reduced TU game with relaxed weights C q ; v
(S) are interpreted as the value that ! assigns to coalition S in the game among coalitions assuming that the members of C q nS are out. In the …rst case, coalition S maintains the weight of the original coalition C q . In the second case, coalition S plays with a weight proportional to its own (reduced) size.
In the particular case x = for all x, both reduced T U games coincide and we write C q ; v
De…nition 1 Given a value and a weighted value ! , we de…ne respectively the coalitional values
In the particular case x = for all x, both expressions coincide and hence we write ( ) :
We concentrate on three particular members of this family, that have been previously studied in the literature:
Example 2 Sh (Sh) is the Owen value (Owen, 1977) .
is the weighted coalitional value with intracoalitional symmetry, and weights given by the size of the coalitions (Levy and McLean, 1989) .
Sh hSh ! i has been studied by Vidal-Puga (2006).
There exist other relevant coalitional values that belong to this family. Let Ba be the Banzhaf value (Banzhaf 1965 , Owen 1975 . Let In be the individual value (Owen 4 , 1978) de…ned as
p be the p-binomial value (Puente, 2000) . Let DP be the Deegan-Packel value (Deegan and Packel, 1979) . Let LSP be the least square prenucleolus (Ruiz, Valenciano and Zarzuelo, 1996) . 
Properties
In this section we present some properties of the values. Moreover, we provide several results.
Classical properties
That is, the worth of the grand coalition is distributed.
Linearity (Lin) Given (N; v; C), (N; w; C) and real numbers and ;
That is, if a game is a linear combination of two games, the value assigns the linear combination of the values of the games.
That is, two symmetric players in (N; v) receive the same.
That is, any null player receives zero.
Independence of Null Players (IN
That is, no agent gets a di¤erent value if a null player is removed from the game.
We say that a weighted value ! satis…es some property if x satis…es this property for each x.
Proposition 4 a) The Shapley value Sh is the only value that satis…es Ef f , Lin, Sym and IN P .
b) The weighted Shapley value Sh ! satis…es IN P .
Proof. a) It is well-known that Sh satis…es Ef f , Lin and Sym. It is also clear that Sh satis…es IN P . On the other hand, it is straightforward to check that Ef f and IN P imply N P . Since Sh is the only value that satis…es Ef f , Lin, Sym and N P (Shapley, 1953b), we deduce the result. b) From Kalai and Samet (1987, Theorem 1) and a classical induction hypothesis on the number of players, it is straightforward to check that Sh ! satis…es IN P .
Lin and Ef f can be adapted to games with coalition structure without changes. For Sym and IN P , we will apply them inside the coalitions and to null coalitions, respectively:
Intracoalitional Symmetry (IS) Given two symmetric players in the same
Independence of Null Coalitions (INC) Given a game (N; v; C) and a null coalition
IN C asserts that if a coalition is null, it does not in ‡uence the allocation within the rest of the players. It is a weaker property than IN P . Notice that IN C and Ef f imply that the aggregated payment of the agents in a null coalition is zero. . The result for h ! i is analogous. Let C = fC 1 ; :::; C m g and let C q 2 C be a null coalition. Denote M = f1; 2; :::; mg.
Notice that there is no ambiguities in the notation v=C
Combining the three last expressions we obtain the result. 
Properties of Balanced Contributions
The principle of Balanced Contributions is used in di¤erent contexts. Myerson (1977) was the …rst to use it for games with graphs. He called it Fairness. Later, Myerson (1980) Balanced Contributions (BC) Given a game (N; v), for all i; j 2 N ,
This property states that for any two players, the amount that each player would gain or lose by the other's withdrawal from the game should be equal.
A remarkable property of this principle is that it completely characterizes the Shapley value with the only help of e¢ ciency.
Proposition 7 (Myerson, 1980) Sh is the only value that satis…es Ef f and BC.
A similar, yet di¤erent version of BC arises when we make the players to become null, instead of leaving the game: Given (N; v) and i 2 N , we de…ne
Under Ef f and Sym, N BC and BC are equivalent:
Proposition 8 Sh is the only value that satis…es Ef f , N BC and Sym.
Proof. It is well-known that Sh satis…es Ef f , Sym and IN P . Since Sh satis…es Ef f and IN P , we have Sh i (N; v j ) = Sh i (N nj; v) for any null player j and any i 2 N nj. Hence, BC and N BC are equivalent for Sh. Since Sh satis…es BC (Proposition 7), Sh also satis…es N BC.
To see the uniqueness, let f be a value satisfying these properties. Fix (N; v). We proceed by induction on jCarr (N; v)j. If jCarr (N; v)j = 0, the result holds from Ef f and Sym. Assume the result holds for less than jCarr (N; v)j non-null players, with jCarr (N; v)j > 0. Let i 2 N .
Assume …rst that player i is a null player. Obviously,
Under Ef f ,
Under the induction hypothesis, f (N; v j ) = Sh (N; v j ) for all j 2 Carr (N; v) and hence
from where we deduce that f i (N; v) is unique for all i 2 Carr (N; v).
Remark 9
Sym is needed in the previous characterization. Let f f1;2g be de…ned as follows: If f1; 2g N , then f Remark 10 Young (1985) characterized Sh as the only value that satis…es Ef f , Sym and Strong Monotonicity (SM ). This last property says that
Hence, Proposition 8 implies that N BC and SM are equivalent under Ef f and Sym.
In order to keep the essence of the Shapley value at the intracoalitional level, we force (null) balanced contributions inside a coalition:
Balanced Intracoalitional Contributions (BIC) Given a game (N; v; C), for all i; j 2 C q 2 C,
This property states that for any two agents that belong to the same coalition in C, the amount that each agent would gain or lose by the other's withdrawal from the game should be equal.
Null Balanced Intracoalitional Contributions (N BIC) Given a game (N; v; C), for all i; j 2 C q 2 C,
This property states that for any two agents that belong to the same coalition in C, the amount that each agent would gain or lose if the other becomes null should be equal.
Proposition 11
a) By de…nition,
By de…nition of (N; v j ), we have v
and so, expression above can be restated as
Since satis…es N BC, we have
Reasoning as before, it is straightforward to check that
and hence the result.
b) By de…nition,
By de…nition of the reduced game, v
Since satis…es BC, we have
and hence the result. S or f1; 3g S, and v (S) = 0 otherwise. Let C = ff1; 2g ; f3gg. Then, 
Other properties
Coordination (Co) For all v; v 0 and C q 2 C, if
for all T C q and all R CnC q , then,
This property says that, given a coalition C q ; if there are changes inside other coalitions, but these changes do not a¤ect to the worth of any subset of C q with the rest of coalitions, then these internal changes in the other coalitions do not a¤ect the …nal payment of each agent in C q :
C r for all T C q and all R CnfC q g. It is enough to prove that v Frequently, is interpreted that players form coalitions in order to improve their bargaining strength (Hart and Kurz, 1983 ). However, as Harsanyi (1977) points out, the bargaining strength does not improve in general. An individual can be worse o¤ bargaining as a member of a coalition than bargaining alone. This is what is known as the "Harsanyi paradox".
The following property avoids the "Harsanyi paradox"in the case where all the agents are symmetric. In the unanimity game with carrier N all the agents are necessary to obtain a positive payment. Hence it seems reasonable that their assignment should be independent of the coalitional structure: It is straightforward to check that, under IS, CSU G is equivalent to IP SU G. We use IP SU G because it follows the same formulation as ESU G.
In addition to Ef f , either ESU G or IP SU G would determine the coalitional value for N; u . Moreover, IP SU G also implies that all the players in the same coalition should receive the same value. Hence the result.
However, these properties are still very weak, since they only apply to a very speci…c unanimity game u 
Characterization
In this section, we present our main result: Assume the result holds for less than n players. Now we prove that the result holds for n players.
It is well-know that every T U game can be expressed as a linear combination of unanimity games. Since f 1 and f 2 satisfy Lin, we can restrict our proof to unanimity games.
Let S N , S 6 = ;. Consider the game u S N . First, we will show that it is enough to restrict the proof to the case where all the coalitions intersect the carrier S. To prove that, suppose that there exists some coalition, say C m 2 C, that does not intersect the carrier; that is, S \ C m = ;.
Clearly, C m is a null coalition. Under IN C, f 
for all i; j 2 C m ; x = 1; 2. By induction hypothesis on jC m j, f From now on, we assume that S \ C q 6 = ; for all C q 2 C: Fix i 2 C q 2 C. We should prove that f
C q and all R CnC q . Proof. Fix T 0 C q . We distinguish three cases: 
Case 2: S q 6 T 0 . In this case, there exists some i 2 S q such that i 6 2 T 0 , and so, S 6
Case 3: R 6 = CnC q . In this case, there exists some C k 2 CnC q such that C k 6 2 R. Since by hypothesis, C r \ S 6 = ; for all C r 2 C, we have that S 6
Since we are under the assumptions of Co (Claim 19), we have f 
for all j 2 N nC q :
We have two possibilities: Cases a and c (the coalitional values satisfy N BIC and IS): Under Ef f and ESU G=IP SU G, by Proposition 15, we have
Under IS, we have f
for all i; j 2 S q (respectively, i; j 2 C q nS q ) and x = 1; 2. Hence it is enough to prove f 
Rearranging terms, (jC q j 1) f
On the other hand, by Proposition 15,
where
Hence,
It is not di¢ cult to check that 1 P Cr2CnCq jC r j r = q (de…ned in the previous case). Hence X Replacing this expression in (2),
Rearranging terms:
And so, f
But by induction hypothesis:
In parts a and c we need to add IS. Take for example the coalitional value F given by F (N; v;
for all i 2 N n f1; 2g and moreover
This coalitional value satis…es Ef f , Lin, IN C, BIC, Co and ESU G, but fails IS.
Analogously, de…ne the coalitional value Take the coalitional value G given by G (N; v; C) = Sh (Sh) (N; v; C) if f3; 4g = 2 C, 1; 2 = 2 N or 1; 2 2 N and they belong to the same coalition in C. When f3; 4g 2 C, 1; 2 2 N and 1; 2 do not belong to the same coalition in C, take G i (N; v; C) = Sh (Sh) i (N; v; C) for all i 2 N n f1; 2g and moreover De…ne the weighted bounded egalitarian value BE ! as BE Table 1 : Properties satis…ed by the coalitional values. "*"(resp. "+") means that this property together with the others with "*"(resp. "+") in the line, characterizes the coalitional value.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we characterize three generalizations of the Shapley value. As for the Owen value, one of its most controversial properties is that of symmetry in the game among coalitions. In our characterization, this symmetry is in fact implied by IP SU G. Other characterizations of the Owen value also include some property that leads to this symmetry. This is the case of property A3 in the original characterization by Owen (1977) ; the coalitional symmetry in Winter (1989) Hart and Kurz (1983) presented an alternative characterization of the Owen value without the property of symmetry in the game among coalitions. Instead, they used a property of Carrier, which implies that the value should not be a¤ected by the presence of null players. Various axiomatic characterizations of the Owen value also use this property: Hamiache (1999 and 2001), Albizuri and Zarzuelo (2004) , and Albizuri (2008) .
One may wonder whether the Carrier axiom is a reasonable requirement in games with coalition structure. Since null players a¤ect the size of the coalition, we should admit that they are not so null (as far as we accept that size is important). Take for example the unanimity game N; u S N with N = f1; 2; 3g and S = f1; 2g. Take C = ff1g ; f2; 3gg. This game models the following situation, as described in Hart and Kurz (1983):
As an everyday example of such a situation, "I will have to check this with my wife/husband"may (but not necessarily) lead to a better bargaining position, due to the fact that the other party has to convince both the player and the spouse. In this example, the role of the symmetry in the game among coalitions is clear: since both f1g and f2; 3g are equally necessary to get a positive payo¤, this payo¤ should be shared equally among them, irrespectively of their respective size. This idea is appropriate to describe situations where the negotiations take place among representatives with the same power of negotiation.
As opposed, Sh [Sh ! ] would assign twice as much to coalition f2; 3g than to coalition f1g, but still maintaining the null player property:
This idea is appropriate to describe situations where the power of negotiation among coalitions depend on their size. One may think for example on political parties that join forces in a Parliament, maintaining however their respective proposal prerogatives. In fact, Kalandrakis (2006) shows that proposal making has a very signi…cant impact on outcomes.
Notice that player 2 would only expect to get 1 2 in case player 3 be not present. Hence, the bene…t of cooperation between players 2 and 3 is Even though EB-IU is a null player in the associated voting game 6 , a minority government was formed with the coalition of EAJ-PNV / EA and EB-IU. Whatever the reason for this decision could be, it suggests that null players can also play a signi…cant role.
